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Abstract
Being a maritime nation with considerable economic and military power,
India has shown keen interest in demonstrating its role as a major
security provider in the IOR. In the Southwest Indian Ocean too, India
has sought to develop a security presence and strengthen its position by
capitalising on its historic ties with the littoral nations of the region
through provision of military training, defence equipment and security
advisors. India’s efforts are mostly directed at making the Indian
influence more visible in the strategic affairs of the region that seem to
be clouded by the increasing Chinese forays into the region.
The paper evaluates the strategic relationships through the maritime
dimensions of India’s engagement with these littoral nations. The
intensity of India’s efforts to be seen as an important maritime security
providing power of the region and the response of these littoral states to
India’s call for greater cooperation forms an important thrust of the
paper. The article argues that India’s national security concerns and
great power ambitions manifest itself in India’s engagement in the
region. However, greater exploitation of its strategic ties with Mauritius
and Seychelles hold the key for greater maritime strategic influence in
the region.
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Introduction 
Geographically, India is a maritime state dominated by the world’s 
third-largest ocean, the Indian Ocean. Its influencing position in the 
Indian Ocean has mostly determined its maritime policy and ambitions 
in the maritime domain. Its archetypal maritime character and vital 
geostrategic location are significant twin factors that have nurtured its 
maritime ambitions. Also given India’s strategic position on the world 
map, any noteworthy initiative of expanding India’s influence without 
any major obstacle can be realized only in the maritime domain. Thus, 
a section of the Indian elites sees a close association between their 
country’s maritime ambitions and its search for great-power status.1  
 
Indian maritime aspirations in the Indian Ocean may be identified as 
seeking pre-eminence and leadership in Indian Ocean affairs. India's 
maritime diplomacy and aspirations were not realized to the fullest 
because of the Indian governments' neglect of the navy as against the 
army and air force. Indian strategic thinkers have always considered 
the most vital threats to India's security as originating from land, 
specifically from the north-west. With the economic liberalization of 
the 1990s, India has recorded an impressive annual growth rate of 7-8 
per cent during the last 20 years or so. With continued growth, India 
has emerged as a key political and economic player at the global level. 
This has resulted in a wide expansion of India’s global interests. To 
maintain unhindered economic growth, India needs to protect its 
overseas trade, investment, and energy flows. Hence, India is 
particularly concerned in protecting its sea-lanes of communications 
necessary for its energy exports. Thus, India has adopted an active 
maritime policy where trade, security, and connectivity have become 
the major issues of India's maritime diplomatic goals. 
 
India’s strategic interests in the Southwest Indian Ocean have widened 
in recent times as India considers the Indian Ocean Region as its 
primary sphere of influence. As such, strategic influence among the 
littoral nations of the Southwest Indian Ocean figures crucial to India’s 
security interests. The South-West Indian Ocean comprises of the 
island nations of Mauritius, Seychelles, and La Reunion. The region is 
also called the ‘Latin Quarter’ because of the preponderance of French 
spoken in its many island states and territories. The Mozambique 
Channel is the major focus of maritime security in the South-West 
Indian Ocean as it is the key route for shipping between the Middle 
East and the Atlantic Ocean. The Mozambique Channel was once a 
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primary trading route between Asia, Europe, and the Americas before 
the opening of the Suez Canal. While commercial traffic at recent times 
has slowed down, the Mozambique Channel continues to be 
strategically important for the eastern coast of Africa. France is the 
strongest power in and around the Mozambique Channel with the 
island of La Reunion as its territory. It is through this base that the 
French navy maintains its strong presence in the western Indian Ocean 
and the eastern coast of Africa. In addition, France patrols the 
Mozambique Channel and maintains a presence in the exclusive 
economic zone around several French islands in the channel through 
this base.2 
 
The article analyses the status of India’s strategic partnership with the 
island nations of the Southwest Indian Ocean, viz. Mauritius, 
Seychelles, and le Reunion. The article evaluates the strategic 
relationships through the maritime dimensions of India’s engagement 
with these littoral nations. While doing so, it throws light on the 
importance of the Southwest Indian Ocean to India’s strategic interests 
and the renewed importance given to extending maritime cooperation 
in the region. The intensity of India’s efforts to be seen as important 
maritime security providing the power of the region and the response 
of these littoral states to India’s call for greater cooperation forms an 
important thrust of the article. The article essentially develops around 
two hypotheses. First, India’s national security concerns and leading 
power ambitions drives its engagement in the Southwest Indian Ocean. 
Second, India’s strategic ties with Mauritius and Seychelles hold the 
key for greater maritime influence in the region. 
 
Importance of the South West Indian Ocean to India’s 
Strategic Interests 
The South-West Indian Ocean, which comprises of the island nations of 
Mauritius, Seychelles, and France, provides an interesting opportunity 
to India to build a greater leading role, if not the supreme sphere of 
influence. In addition, as the largest Indian Ocean littoral state, with a 
stable democratic polity and credible maritime power, India has an 
important and meaningful role in the security scenario of the region. 
 
Islands have always played an important role in maritime strategy, but 
its significance has been underappreciated in the diplomatic circles of 
India until recent times. Traversing through history, we could find that 
rising nations have controlled strategic islands to project power across 
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vast areas of the globe. However, the end of the Cold War, development 
of nationalism in these littoral island nations and the gradual 
acceptance of the established international order brought down the 
occupation of islands as territories of western powers.3 The mounting 
significance of the island nations of this region is that India’s access to 
and influence over these islands will provide strategic advantages like 
longer maritime deployments, possible military infrastructure, thereby 
influencing the response from the other competitors. 
 
India has had a strong relationship with the two of littoral countries of 
the region viz. Mauritius and the Seychelles. Nonetheless, the changing 
geopolitical environment, China's increasing forays into the Indian 
Ocean, and the Indo-French bonhomie facilitated India’s activism in 
the littoral countries of the South-West Indian Ocean. As Beijing 
continues to expand its presence across the maritime domain, India has 
reshaped its maritime strategies to secure its national interests, more 
so in the Indian Ocean Region. As with any other maritime space, the 
islands of the South-West Indian Ocean region have a significant 
influence in shaping the new security architecture in the region. 
 
For India, the most crucial strategic islands in the South West are 
Mauritius and the Seychelles. These islands span the ocean from India 
to Africa. Their strategic importance is highlighted by their location 
along key sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs). These islands are vital 
to and can facilitate a navy’s continuous presence along, key 
international shipping routes, allowing a navy to patrol and secure 
SLOCs during peace times and an option to interdict and cut off an 
adversary’s communications during times of conflict. Such presence 
allows navies to project power, increasing their profile as a net security 
provider. Operations from and near these four islands provide good 
coverage of the south and the central Indian Ocean and thus developing 
strategic relationships with these countries is vital for India’s security 
and economic interests. 
 
Change of Policy and Alignment in the National Government 
Regarding the South-West Asian Region 
If one analyses the timeline of India's maritime diplomatic practices, 
one could easily find that the vigor and determination to protect and 
enhance its maritime interests in the IOR had received a considerable 
boost with the start of the 21st century. Things started changing with an 
element of pragmatism aided with a neo-liberal approach replacing the 
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ambiguity of Indian maritime aspirations. This was the period where 
the economy showed signs of progress and the fastest growing rate 
because of various structural changes brought in the previous decade. 
After years of hesitation, India has done away with its inward-looking 
foreign policy and has started seeing the South-West Asian region as an 
important area of interest. In 2013, Manmohan Singh stated in a 
speech “we (India) have also sought to assume our responsibility for 
stability in the Indian Ocean Region. We are well positioned, therefore, 
to become a net provider of security in our immediate region and 
beyond.”4 Twenty-first century India witnessed the change of power in 
administration along with the adoption of maritime strategies by the 
Indian Navy. With changes of time and in global circumstances, India 
has displayed more enthusiasm in protecting its legitimate rights and 
aspirations in the IOR. This increasing focus is because of the 
realization of the strategic advantage that India holds, being 
surrounded by the ocean, which also carries 90% of its foreign trade. In 
addition, the importance of developing strategic relationships with the 
littoral states of the IOR has been intensified by China's increased naval 
power projection in the IOR. China has expanded its strategic reach 
and influence in the region by supporting various economic enterprises 
in the island nations of the region. With the recognition of the necessity 
to interact more actively with littoral states of the IOR in a bid to 
minimize Chinese influence in the region, active maritime security 
engagements have emerged as a cornerstone of India's regional foreign 
policy initiatives. Thus, with the changes of time and circumstances in 
the region, India has significantly reshaped its maritime strategy and 
looks forward to greater involvement in the maritime affairs of the 
region. 
 
Status of India’s Maritime Influence in the South-West 
Indian Ocean 
With the growth and evolution of the Indian Navy, it has moved beyond 
its self-demarcated maritime domains of the IN stretching from the 
Red Sea to the Malacca Straits and has established crucial interests in 
projecting itself as one of the major security providers in the region. In 
this, along with an increasingly optimistic leadership with a growing 
and robust naval force, the political will of these littoral countries 
stands as an imperative in the fulfilment of India's maritime ambitions 
with the littoral countries of the South-West Indian Ocean.  
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Since independence, India has shown a profound interest in being a 
maritime security provider throughout the southwest IOR (Indian 
Ocean Region) through combating Somalia-based piracy and help in 
the policing of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the island 
nations. Capitalizing on the long history of bilateral trust and goodwill 
with the littoral nations of the South West Indian Ocean, India has 
been successful in building strategic relationships with Mauritius and 
Seychelles through its security and economic partnerships and has 
improved its relationship with France. India’s relationship with the 
Seychelles and Mauritius presents an interesting scenario where it has 
been successfully balancing the demands of major powers for using it 
for military purposes while at the same time relying on India as a sort 
of benign security guarantor. In recent years, France has recognized 
India’s rise as an influential power in Asia and thus has taken due note 
of India’s growing naval ambitions. Meanwhile, India’s desire to build a 
greater leading role is challenged by France’s traditional stronghold 
and the increasing American and Chinese influence into the region.  
 
It may be noted that the United States has a permanent base in Diego 
Garcia, which gives it a strategic upper hand in the maritime affairs of 
the region. This strategically significant island was leased to the United 
States for setting up a military base in 1966 by the UK. Diego Garcia 
has served as a hub for American troops during their war against 
terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, there are increasing Chinese 
forays into the region where China has invested heavily in a special 
economic zone in Mauritius along with other strategic investments on 
the island. China plans to build a logistics and services hub in the 
economic zone, together with a university and an oceanographic 
research Centre.5 Thus, China’s growing relationship with Mauritius 
and other Indian Ocean littoral nations threaten to dilute India’s 
traditional influence in the region. This has led India to take a more 
assertive approach in improving its influence and building strategic 
partnerships with the littoral regions of the South-West Indian Ocean. 
However, in order to understand India’s present status in the strategic 
scenario of the South-West Indian Ocean, a brief review of the strategic 
relationships with the principal island nations of Mauritius, the 
Seychelles, and France is undertaken in the following section. 
 
India’s Relationship with Mauritius 
India’s relationship with Mauritius goes long back to colonial history 
where the European colonists imported indentured labor from India to 
work in its sugar cane plantations in Mauritius. However, diplomatic 
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relations between India and Mauritius started in 1948, and since then 
diplomatic ties have continually deepened, and today they touch 
diverse areas of cooperation. After attainment of independence on 
March 12, 1968, the first Prime Minister and the Father of the 
Mauritian Nation Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam accorded centrality to 
India in its foreign policy. With a strong population of Indian descent, 
Mauritius had always favored Indian strategic interests and acts as a 
key security partner in the region. India has considered Mauritius one 
of its closest international partners and has acted more or less in 
cooperation with the United States on issues relating to Mauritius. 
After the departure of the British Royal Navy in 1974, India effectively 
played an important role in protecting Mauritius’ security. India has 
helped establish the Coast Guard of Mauritius for policing its EEZ and 
has provided training and equipment to the security forces. 6 India’s 
strategic relationship with Mauritius was further strengthened with the 
assistance providing in averting numerous political coups during the 
early and mid-80s.  
 
Highlighting the bilateral trust and goodwill between India and 
Mauritius is the fact that India provides the commander of the 
Mauritian Coast Guard and Police Helicopter Squadron.7 The Indian 
Navy has also been providing maritime security to Mauritius’ EEZ 
through periodic patrols since 2003. Since 2009, Indian and Mauritius’ 
maritime forces are involved in jointly patrolling the Mauritian 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as Indian naval ships make regular 
port calls to the nation and conduct exercises with its Coast Guard. 
India has also helped Mauritius in building its National Hydrographic 
Unit as well as the coastal radar system that has both economic and 
strategic purposes. It may be noted that Mauritius has been able to 
avoid the costs of maintaining a dedicated military force to fulfil its 
security requirements and has maintained only paramilitary 
capabilities. This is because of its close defense and security 
relationship with India, which acts as its security guarantor that 
accomplishes the strategic interests of both the nations.8 
 
India has given several Line of Credits to Mauritius since 2010, for the 
purchase of security equipment like offshore patrol vehicles, specialized 
equipment and vehicles, and waterjet fast attack craft. These lines of 
credit given to the country have proved to be essential for the security 
of its economy as the nation is affected by non-traditional threats like 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, piracy, and the possibility 
of maritime terrorism that invariably affect Mauritius and its economic 
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interests. India has also installed a radar coastal surveillance system 
throughout the Mauritian island chain. It includes five stations on the 
islands of Mauritius and one each on Rodrigues, Saint Brandon, and 
the Agalega Islands.9 
 
Since 2006, New Delhi has been discussing with Port Louis for a long-
term lease of the strategically significant Agalega islands to India 
ostensibly for tourism.10 However, it has been widely speculated that 
New Delhi anticipates upgrading an airstrip on North Agalega to 
service Indian manned and unmanned surveillance aircraft.11 Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi’s visited Mauritius in 2015, where the two 
countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding to improve 
cooperation on ocean economy, culture, agriculture, sea and air 
transport facilities in Agalega and increase capabilities of the Mauritian 
Defense Forces in safeguarding their interests that further 
strengthened their partnership.12 During the visit, the Offshore Patrol 
Vessel Barracuda, built by an Indian shipyard under a Government of 
India Line of Credit, was also commissioned into the Mauritian 
National Coast Guard.13 Since the agreement on Agalega islands, there 
have been several reports anticipating Indian naval and coastguards’ 
interests to set up transponder systems and surveillance infrastructure, 
which has led to some local protest.14 At present, the government is 
closely watching a battle brewing in the Mauritius parliament over the 
project. Accusing of compromising with the sovereignty of the nation, 
the Opposition questioned the government over India’s involvement in 
the project. They also raised issues regarding its costs and a possible 
military component. Thus, the Jugnauth led government had a hard 
time convincing the national assembly, further stalling the process. 
Nonetheless, the $87 million project, to be funded by India, has been 
awarded to two Indian companies. The Hindu, reports that surveys 
have begun to fulfil the contract signed on September 2018, which 
stipulated that construction begins by February 12, 2019, and be 
completed in 2021.15 If this materializes, it would significantly improve 
India’s air surveillance capabilities throughout the Western Indian 
Ocean, including the Mozambique Channel. Brahma Chellaney, an 
Indian expert on security issues, said using Agaléga as a “logistics hub” 
could help Delhi “sustain naval operations in the south-west Indian 
Ocean.”16 
 
In 2017, the Mauritian Prime Minister Pravin Kumar Jugnauht chose 
India as his first foreign visit where they signed four agreements, one 
including an agreement on maritime security. Further, both the 
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countries have agreed that effective management of conventional and 
non-conventional threats in the Indian Ocean is fundamental for 
pursuing economic opportunities. Both the nations agreed to cooperate 
against piracy, humans and drugs trafficking as well as illegal fishing 
and other forms of illegal exploitation of marine resources. India is also 
supporting the National Coast Guard of Mauritius to augment its 
capacity through Project Trident, an integrated development project of 
the NCG. India will also renew the life of the Coast Guard Ship 
Guardian, which was given to Mauritius under an assistance program.17 
 
The Indian President visited Mauritius on March 2018 where he 
announced a US$100 million new line of credit (LOC) to the nation for 
the procurement of the Multipurpose Offshore Patrol Vessel along with 
an additional grant component of US$5 million.18 Highlighting that 
“India and Mauritius share common security concerns in the Indian 
Ocean Region,” the President identified Mauritius as India’s “gateway” 
to Africa as well as the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). According to 
President Kovind, the two countries have a “natural convergence” of 
interests and “exemplary” bilateral cooperation in maritime security 
and counterterrorism. 19 Therefore, the LOC (US$100 million) meant 
for another offshore patrol vehicle to be provided by India as 
announced by India’s President Kovind is in line with India’s consistent 
policy to strengthen the surveillance and reconnaissance capacity of the 
Mauritian National Coast Guard by modernizing it further.20Thus, a 
sharp increase in the quantum of the Indian LOCs to Mauritius also 
highlights the significance being given to the relationship. The recent 
LOC announced by President Kovind for acquiring another offshore 
patrol vessel reinforces the strategic depth of the relationship between 
the two countries. 
 
India’s Strategic Ties with the Seychelles 
The Seychelles archipelago, strategically located in the Indian Ocean, 
has been successfully balancing the demands of major powers for using 
it for military purposes while at the same time relying on India as a sort 
of benign security guarantor. India-Seychelles diplomatic relationships 
started soon after the independence of the Seychelles in 1976. Since 
then, India and Seychelles enjoy a relationship developed on close 
friendship, understanding, and cooperation. There has been a high-
level exchange of visits since Seychelles attained its independence.  
 
India’s close relationship with the Seychelles started from the year 1982 
when President Albert Rene sought India’s help to intervene in an 
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attempted coup by foreign mercenaries and protect him.21 In 1986, 
India’s status as a benign security guarantor to the Seychelles was 
further recognized when an attempted coup against President Rene was 
prevented with the help of the Indian Navy.22 Coup threats against the 
Seychelles government receded by the late 1980s. Hereafter, the India-
Seychelles security relationship focused on training the Seychelles 
security forces.23 Among other things, India built the Seychelles 
Defense Academy in 1989 and was largely responsible for its 
management. India has also been policing the Seychelles’ EEZ under a 
bilateral defense cooperation agreement signed in 2003. India also 
provides training to the Seychelles Special Forces in VIP protection, 
commando operations and diving. Under its defense cooperation, India 
also acquired the privilege and power of supplying a maritime security 
advisor and naval advisor to the Seychelles President.24 The Indian 
Navy is known to conduct anti-piracy patrols and hydrographic surveys 
regularly in the waters of the Seychelles. India has also started the 
construction of a coastal surveillance radar system in the Seychelles.25  
 
In June 2010, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced India’s 
decision to write off almost half of Seychelles’ debt to India. This 
gesture was widely seen as a strategy to bring back the Seychelles from 
the growing incentives of Chinese assistance. In the months following 
Prime Minister Singh’s announcement, the then Indian foreign 
minister S.M. Krishna and defense minister A.K. Anthony visited the 
Seychelles in July 2010. During his visit, Anthony sought to strengthen 
Indo-Seychelles defense partnership by better institutionalizing the 
previously ad hoc defense cooperation between the two countries. 
Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi’s visited Seychelles in 2015 as part 
of his three-nation trip in the IOR, which was the first Prime 
Ministerial level visit to the nation in 34 years. It was a highly 
successful visit with substantive outcomes, including the signing of four 
Agreements/MoUs concerning Renewable Energy Cooperation, 
Cooperation in the field of Hydrography; Protocol on Sale of 
Navigational Charts / Electronic Navigational Charts; and Agreement 
on the Development of facilities on Assumption Island. Again, 
Seychelles President James Alix Michel’s visited India in Aug 2015, 
when five agreements on bilateral air services, agricultural cooperation, 
blue economy, tax information exchange, and gifting of a second 
Dornier aircraft to Seychelles were signed.26 
 
India and Seychelles have an elaborate architecture of defense and 
security cooperation that has deepened over the years with the growing 
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piracy menace and other economic offences in the strategic Indian 
Ocean region. By 2010, India focused on assisting the Seychelles to 
counter piracy in its neighboring waters. In pursuance of the MOU on 
Hydrography signed during the Prime Minister’s visit in Mar 2015, 
Indian Naval Ship INS Darshak visited Seychelles from 5 Nov to 19 Dec 
2015 to conduct a hydrographic survey of Victoria Port and adjoining 
areas. Two patrol boats PS Topaz and PS Constant were gifted by India 
to Seychelles in 2005 and 2014 respectively. Indian Coast Guard’s Fast 
Interceptor Boat C-405 (rechristened ‘PB Hermes’) was gifted to 
Seychelles in 2016.27 Acting on its maritime strategy of bringing the 
littoral countries under its arena, India gifted one Dornier maritime 
surveillance aircraft to Seychelles in 2013 and the second promised 
Dornier aircraft was delivered to Seychelles in June 2018. India gifted 
and installed six coastal surveillance radar systems in Seychelles in 
2015, enabling better coastal security for Seychelles. 
 
During Seychelles, President Danny Faure’s six-day visit to India in 
June 2018, India, and Seychelles agreed to work together on the project 
to develop a naval base at the Assumption Island, keeping each other’s 
concerns in mind. Faure remarked that the Assumption Island project 
was discussed and the two countries equally agreed to work together 
bearing each other’s interests.28 The significance Assumption Island is 
its location in the outer group of the 115 islands that make up the 
boundary of Seychelles, lying north of Madagascar. A joint military 
build-up would have immensely benefitted both the nation’s geo-
strategic interests along with countering the growing menace of piracy 
off the Mozambique coast. It may be reminded that there has been 
growing political opposition in Seychelles to this agreement signed with 
India. Nonetheless, India ramped up its defense partnership with the 
Indian Ocean Region country by handing over a Dornier aircraft and a 
USD 100-million defense related credit to Seychelles for augmenting its 
defense capabilities.29 The military and naval assistance being provided 
by the Indian government to Seychelles are aimed at ensuring free, 
open, and inclusive Indian Ocean Region, which has been recapitulated 
in its policy of Security and Growth for All in the Region. Through this 
policy, the Indian government is trying to promote safe and inclusive 
growth across the waters of the ocean by engaging all stakeholders and 
littoral nations of the region. 
 
The Seychelles has so far been successful in balancing the power 
struggle for influence by major Indian Ocean powers like the United 
States, the UAE, and China to its own advantage. However, in the light 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 12, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss2/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.2.1726
52 
of India’s growing anxiety over PLAN’s access to Port Victoria for the 
operational turnaround of PLAN vessels, New Delhi was assured by the 
Seychelles President that India’s status, as the Seychelles’ “main 
development partner” would remain non-negotiable.30 This indicates 
that India has been able to safeguard its strategic partnership with 
Seychelles and strengthen the relationship even with changing times. 
 
India’s Strategic Understanding with France 
France is the strongest power in and around the Mozambique Channel 
where the French Department of Reunion, about 200 km off Mauritius, 
is the headquarters of the French South Indian Ocean armed forces. Its 
large base at Djibouti and its ownership of Antarctic territories, which 
include the Kerguelen Islands, St Paul and Amsterdam Islands and the 
Crozet Islands, support France’s security presence.  
 
Historically, India has had a special regard for France for its semi-
autonomous strategic posture within the Western alliance. However, 
concerned about growing Indian influence in the Reunion islands with 
around 25 per cent of the population of Indian descent, France 
hesitated to open an Indian consulate in Reunion until 1986. Thus, 
there was a degree of low-level competition between India and France 
for strategic influence relating to French cultural influence in Mauritius 
and its physical proximity to Reunion islands.31 
 
In addition, France was not invited to be a member of the Indian Ocean 
Region- Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) during its 
formation in 1997. As per the criteria of membership, only littoral 
states could be part of IORA. France claim for qualification is through 
its territories in the Indian Ocean. Despite the support from Australia, 
South Africa, and Singapore for French membership, India refused to 
bring France in the grouping fearing a potentially influential 
competitor to the organization.32 In addition, the former French 
colonies of Mauritius and Seychelles resisted France becoming a 
member of the IORA, as it believes that their voice in the group could 
be muffled.33 Therefore, France had to be content with the status of a 
dialogue partner in IOR-ARC.  
 
However, since the last decade or so, particularly after the coming to 
power of the UPA government in India, the strategic relationship 
between India and France has improved, with France realizing that 
India will rise as an influential power in Asia and so it should be 
engaged early on to shape the future strategic equations in the region. 
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France has taken due note of India’s growing naval ambitions and has 
anticipated that the Indian Navy is going to be a major force in the 
Indian Ocean in the near future, and has become increasingly 
comfortable with an expanded Indian maritime security presence in the 
region.  
 
France has also encouraged India’s growing role in policing the South-
West Indian Ocean against pirates. However, while supporting India’s 
rise, it has also tried to ensure that India would acknowledge its 
legitimate interests in the IOR. The consolidation of India’s and 
France’s strategic perspectives on the Indian Ocean was globally seen 
as part of a broader pattern of Indo-French defense cooperation in the 
Indian Ocean. The UPA government also invited France to be a 
member of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2008. France has 
derived great satisfaction in that it was the only Western country to be 
invited by India for launching the IONS. However, as regards the 
conduct of joint operations with the French Navy, the UPA government 
stuck to the Indian tradition of opting out of any coalition operations 
that are not under the aegis of the United Nations. As an alternative, 
New Delhi is seen organizing anti-piracy operations as part of the 
recent IONS. However, India has now accepted France as a net security 
provider in the Indian Ocean Region. As part of its strategic 
partnership in the IOR, India has sought to include France in annual 
bilateral naval exercises, since 1993, which have grown in size and 
complexity. Since 2001, these exercises have been termed "Varuna," 
and 18 editions of the same have been conducted until date. The 2018 
edition of the Varuna naval exercise focused on submarine and anti-
submarine warfare, along with building greater maritime domain 
awareness.  
 
France’s most important strategic partnership with India concerns 
armament transfers, often a critical factor in its external relations. 
India’s lucrative arms market has often lured defense industries the 
world over. France has won a series of contracts, including the transfer 
of six Scorpene submarines in 2005 and the upgrading of the Indian 
aircraft fleet of Mirage 2000 in 2010.34 Since 2012, New Delhi and 
Paris have worked on a new series of important orders: An agreement 
to co-develop and co-produce short-range surface-to-air missiles has 
reached the final phase along with the initiation of negotiations for a 
US$12 billion contract for the transfer of 126 Rafale fighter jets. At 
present, India had signed a government-to-government deal with 
France in 2016 to buy 36 Rafale fighter jets at the cost of about Rs 580 
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billion (Rs 58,000 crore).35 New Delhi’s policy of strengthening its 
strategic partnership with Paris also consists of defense and technology 
development.  
 
French President Emannuel Macron’s visited India on the Indian Prime 
Minister's invitation on March 2018. In a change of policy and reaching 
a major breakthrough in maritime cooperation, India and France 
signed an agreement to access each other’s military facilities, including 
opening naval bases to warships.36 This agreement could potentially 
improve the reach and deployment of Indian naval forces in the 
southern Indian Ocean. In total, fourteen agreements were signed 
during the visit. However, the key defense agreement signed was for the 
“provision of reciprocal logistics support between their Armed 
Forces.”37 The agreement echoes similarity to that signed by India with 
the United States in 2016, which allowed the use of each other’s 
installations for repair and replenishment of supplies by the militaries 
of each country. According to the India-French joint statement, the 
agreement will facilitate the reciprocal provision of logistic support, 
supply, and services between the Indian and French armed forces 
during authorized port visits, joint exercises, and joint training among 
others.38 This agreement came in the backdrop of professed closer 
cooperation in the Indian Ocean region. Prime Minister Modi 
commented that both the countries believe in the potentiality of the 
Indian Ocean region playing a important role in the happiness, 
progress, and prosperity of the world. He reiterated that both the 
nations are committed to strengthening cooperation in areas of 
environment, maritime security, marine resources, and freedom of 
navigation and over flight. Echoing these words, the French President 
said both the countries would have "unprecedented" level of 
cooperation to ensure peace and stability in the Indian and the Pacific 
Ocean.39 Overall, it may be seen that France now appreciates India as a 
key partner in providing logistical support for the deployment of the 
French fleet and naval aviation in peacetime and a potential partner in 
regional crisis prevention. In addition, India acknowledges France as a 
net security provider in the Indian Ocean and intends to work with it to 
promote stability in the region.  
 
Conclusion 
If we compare India’s strategic influence in the South-West Indian 
Ocean, we will find that the region provides an interesting opportunity 
to India to build a greater leading role, if not the supreme sphere of 
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influence. India has traditional ties with most of the island states in the 
South-West Indian Ocean region, owing to a sizeable population of 
Indian descent and being the natural successor to most of British 
Indian Ocean Territories. As such, since independence, India has taken 
over the responsibility of being the net security provider of the region. 
However, New Delhi’s effort to be a net security provider in the region 
is restricted by the powerful American and French presence in the 
region through their respective overseas territories. More so, the 
growing Chinese influence in the Seychelles and Mauritius has been a 
major concern in India’s strategic circles, which has threatened to 
dilute India’s traditional influence in the region.   
 
India’s recent focus to deepen ties with the island nations of the Indian 
Ocean region is largely dictated by national security concerns and great 
power ambitions. India’s maritime security cooperation with the littoral 
nations of the region is directed at ensuring greater visibility of the 
Indian flag and countering the growing Chinese naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean. As the Indian navy is looking forward to continuous 
deployments in seven key areas of the Indian Ocean, developing access 
to and collaboration with these littoral islands has become significantly 
more important for India’s strategic interests. While India has been 
successful in maintaining a presence in Mauritius and Seychelles 
through annual patrols and assistance in those waters, India's lack of 
logistical support stands in the way of ensuring sustained presence 
required for an effective mission based deployment. Nevertheless, the 
recently concluded joint collaboration, such as logistics agreements 
with France and the United States has the potential of slightly 
overcoming the operational challenges faced in the region. In addition, 
if the arrangements in Assumption Island in the Seychelles and the 
Agalega Islands of Mauritius come to fruition in the near future, it 
would significantly improve India’s air surveillance capabilities 
throughout the Western Indian Ocean, including the Mozambique 
Channel. Thus, India’s strategic partnership with Mauritius and 
Seychelles holds the key for greater strategic influence in the region. 
Hence, Indian efforts at building possible military infrastructure in 
Seychelles and Mauritius underline New Delhi’s realization of its 
challenges in operating in those waters.  
 
India enjoys considerable goodwill among the nations of the Southwest 
Indian Ocean, and so New Delhi needs to reciprocate the confidence 
bestowed on the nation and be more assertive in portraying as the net 
security provider of the region. The decision to expand the reach of the 
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Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation between India, Sri Lanka and 
the Maldives by inviting Mauritius and Seychelles in 2014 as ‘guests’ is 
a welcome direction in this step. However, there has been no meeting 
of national security advisors of the concerned parties since then, and 
India needs to show more seriousness in including them in an 
expanded maritime security construct. New Delhi’s efforts in the region 
should not be in the form of reactions to Chinese inroads in the region, 
but be based on a continued strategic engagement focused on economic 
and security partnership. India should also continue to improve its 
relationship with France that has seen major converging of interests 
among them in recent times. The efforts to build a major strategic role 
in the region should be more consistent than what has been evident 
over the last decade or so. Thus, India's hopes of becoming a leading 
security guarantor in the region depend on how it engages the littoral 
island nations in a coherent regional framework and re-examining its 
strategic partnership with the greater powers of the region. 
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